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TOLERANCE  RECONSIDERED©
By MARTHA MINOW*
One  of the  paradoxes  of  liberal  societies  arises  from  the
commitment  to tolerance!  A society committed  to  respecting the
viewpoints and customs of diverse people within a pluralistic society
inevitably  encounters  this  challenge:  will  you  tolerate  those  who
themselves  do  not  agree  to  respect  the viewpoints  or  customs  of
others?  Paradoxically, the liberal commitment to tolerance requires,
at  some  point,  intolerance  for  those  who  would  reject  that  very
commitment.
Imagine  this  paradox,  however,  from  the  other  direction;
imagine  the perspective  of the  member of a group  who rejects the
liberal  commitment to  respect the viewpoints  or  customs of others,
and  yet,  lives  in  a  liberal  society.  This  person  may  see  the  very
toleration for variety  as  a  threat  to  the  integrity  and  coherence  of
his  or  her community's  way  of life.2  This  perspective  is,  perhaps,
made  even  more  understandable  when  a  further  assumption  of
liberal societies is brought to view.  Liberalism treats the proper unit
0Copyright,  1990, Martha  Minow.
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suggestions  and  challenges.
1  See H. Marcuse,  B.  Moore  Jr. &  R.P.  Wolff, A  Critique of Pure Tolerance (Boston:
Beacon  Press, 1965).
2 See also J. Halberstam,  "'The Paradox of Tolerance" (1982-83)  14 Philosophical  Forum
190  (tolerance cannot even arise as a question  unless the two people or groups disagree with
one another, and traditional orthodoxies  require commitments that are deliberately intolerant,
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for  concern  as  the  separate  and  distinct  individual.  It  is  the
individual who  bears rights  to develop  and  express  viewpoints  that
en  deserve  tolerance,  and  it  is  the  individual  who  is  obliged  to
tolerate  others.  A contrasting  assumption,  however,  identifies  the
individual as importantly located within a group of shared traditions.
Someone  proceeding  with  this contrasting  assumption  could  argue
that  true  tolerance  requires  recognition  and  respect  for  this
contrasting  mode of group identity.  A diverse society would include
some  subcommunities  that do  not  embrace the  attitudes  of liberal
society  and  instead  make  commitments  contrary  to  tolerance.
Tolerance would thus require respect even for a subcommunity  that
inculcates  attitudes that are inconsistent with - indeed, intolerant  of
- the liberal  commitments  to individual rights  and to obligations  of
tolerance.  Unless  the larger society  respects  such subcommunities,
it  threatens  their  very  viability  and  existence.4  Paradoxically,
perhaps,  this  subcommunity  views  liberal  tolerance  as  intolerance.
Indeed,  to  the  subcommunity,  tolerance  that  stops  short  of
accommodation  is  in effect intolerance,  and  tolerance  that imposes
routes  of access.to  the larger  society for each  individual  inside  the
subcommunity  represents  an  invasion of the subcommunity's  values
and ways of life.
Thus,  it  depends  on  your  perspective.  Tolerance  without
accommodation  perpetuates  assumptions  that some  - who  put  up
with others  - are  actually  superior to those  others.  From another
perspective,  the  very  injunction  to  put  up  with  others  may  be
experienced  as  putting down  some ways of life.
The  debate  between  these two  perspectives  on tolerance  is
complicated  by its  intersection  with  another debate  concerning  the
allocation of political and legal authority among local, state, national,
and  international  levels  of government.  A superficial  guess  might
3 W.C. McWilliams,  "American  Pluralism:  The Old  Order Passeth" in L  Kristol  & P.
Weavers eds, The Americans:  An Inquiry into Fundamental  Concepts of Man (Lexington,  MA.
Lexington Books, 1976) at 293, 297; (traditionalists see humans as naturally dependent, social
and  political,  and  requiring  strong  bonds  to  family,  church,  and  community  for the  very
development  of personal identity;  for them, virtue  is more important  than freedom).
4 In particular, demands that each individual remain  open to multiple viewpoints and  that
the community preserve rights for each individual  to choose where and  how to live threaten
grave  intolerance  toward  the  subcommunity,  its  identity,  and  its  needs.  See  generally
Wisconsin  v. Yoder 406  U.S.  205  (1972).
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suggest that allocation of primary political power to local authorities
would preserve cultural diversity, and increasing grants or concessions
of  authority  to  centralized  or  co-ordinated  authorities  would  risk
interference  with  the cultural  diversity.  But  a  closer  look  at  the
actual  experiences  of  cultural  diversity  around  the  world
demonstrates many contrary patterns.  Often, increased centralization
affords  new  protection  for  minority  subgroups  that otherwise  face
intolerance  by local authorities.
Centralized  rather than decentralized  authority may be more
protective of subgroups  for two  reasons.  First, local governmental
units seldom correspond  to homogeneous  communities.  Thus, even
with  the  most  decentralized  form  of  official  authority,  potential
conflicts  among cultural groups  and tensions between  majorities  and
minorities arise  and persist.  Secondly, centralized authorities may be
more  likely  to  pursue  norms  of tolerance  because  of pressures  to
solicit  respect  and  maintain  legitimacy  among  a  broader  array  of
interest  groups  and communities.
It  may  often  be  the  case  that  the  content  of the  norms
adopted by a  government, at any level, will be more relevant to the
question  of tolerance  for  diverse cultures  than will the actual  level
of government  entrusted  with  final  authority  on  the question.  A
local,  state,  national,  or  transnational  authority  could  embrace  a
policy  of  respect  for  the  practices  adopted  by  a  minority
subcommunity.  Similarly, any level of governmental  authority  could
adopt a rule that is intolerant of cultural practices  or deviations from
the rules applicable  to the majority.
In sum, like the paradox of tolerance itself, a related paradox
arises  in the choices  from  among competing models of relationships
between  and  among  local,  regional,  national,  and  international
political units - and even non-governmental  units, such as designated
religious  institutions.  A commitment to respect diversity  may seem
to  support  respect  for  the  more  immediate  levels  of  government
through  which  policies  tailored  to  particular  communities  may  be
developed.  Andyet,  minority groups  in  any given  community  may
find  greater  support  for  their  different  needs  and  interests  in  a
strong  political  authority  that announces  protections  for  minorities
and  restricts  the  prerogatives  of  local  authorities.  A  political
commitment  to  diversity  may  require,  at  some  point,  regulation  of
the self-determination  processes of local authority in order to protect
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subgroups within their midst, even though the local  authorities  may
themselves  assert the goal of diversity in order to preserve their own
autonomy.
Yet,  there  arises  a  third  paradox  or  twist  in  the  problem.
Centralized  authority structures may recognize and implement rights
that are contrary to the preferences of local authorities, and thereby
create  avenues  for individuals  to challenge  practices  of subgroups.
The  results  may  pose  a  threat  to  the  autonomy  and  vitality  of
distinctive cultures.  Cultural subcommunities may thus clash with the
prerogatives  of  local  authorities,  the  preferences  of  centralized
authorities,  and the commitments  of any  governmental  authority  to
respect  rights  of  individuals  to  leave  or  reject  aspects  of  a
subcommunity.  The creation  of centralized  authorities  empowered
to protect subgroups may itself threaten the viability of subgroups by
elaborating  rights for  individuals  to escape  subgroups.  Centralized
authority  may  challenge  cultural  diversity  in  other  ways  as  well,
especially  in  pursuing  goals  that  are  insensitive  to  or disruptive  of
some forms of cultural  practice  and identity.
These  issues  are  vital  as  various  nations  and  continents
struggle  with  relationships  among  subgroups  in  their  midst.  Will
adoption  of  national  and  international  conceptions  of  individual
rights  promote  the ideals  of tolerance, or impose  one from  among
competing  perspectives  about  individuality,  group  identity,  and
fundamental  values?  As Europe  heads  toward  1992, and promotes
harmonization  of  economic  and  regulatory  arrangements,  the
treatment  of ethnic  and religious  subgroups  will  surface  even  if it
is not intended  as a subject for concern.  As the United States and
Canada struggle with new waves of immigrants, old issues  about the
treatment of subgroups will be posed in the context of evolving legal
rights.  Similar  issues  in  India,  Sri  Lanka,  the  Soviet  Union,  and
other  parts  of  the  world  have  inspired  scholarly  and  political
attention
Tensions between solutions that emphasize the rights of each
distinct  individual  and  solutions  that  recognize  a  realm  of
self-governance  for  subgroups  become  especially  salient  when
See  generally  D.L.  Horowitz,  Ethnic Groups In  Conflict  (Berkeley:  University  of
California  Press, 1985).
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women's  rights as  pronounced  by central  governments  conflict  with
deference to distinctive cultural groupings which operate on contrary
assumptions  about  women,  families,  and  community.  With  the
potential  conflict  between  women's  rights  and  respect  for  cultural
differences  as  a  recurring  concern,  I  will  examine  the  issues  of
tolerance  through  a  discussion  of definitions  and  assumptions,  and
through an exploration of a range of challenges  to cultural diversity
that arise across  a range of contemporary societies.  Approaching the
issues  from another direction, however, I identify the threats to such
values  as  gender  equality  and  individual  freedom  posed  by
unrelenting  commitment  to cultural  integrity.  I explore  arguments
for  maintaining  cultural  diversity  while  articulating  a  conception  of
oppression  to  set the boundaries  of tolerance.  I  also  suggest  the
consequences  of  these  arguments  for  models  of  governmental
authority.  I recommend,  and hope here  to exemplify,  a recognition
of  the  long-standing  tensions  and  paradoxes  of  tolerance,
centralization  and  decentralization,  respect  for  individuals,  and
respect  for  groups  that  demands  a  continuing  struggle  to  avoid
simple  answers  about these subjects.
I.  PRELUDE: STARTING  POINTS
It is uncertain how much we agree and disagree on the issues
addressed  here.  We  certainly  cannot  begin  to  find  out  until  we
reach  some  tentative agreement  about what we  mean.  Yet, it is  a
fair  guess  that  the  very  terms  we  use  embody  ambiguities  and
disagreements  rather than providing  tools for sorting them out.
At the risk of seeming  didactic  - and  the probably  greater
risk  of proving inconsistent  over  the course of the paper  - I offer
some  basic  definitions  for the  central  concepts  in  the paper.  I do
not  claim  to  resolve  persistent  disputes  over  the  meanings  of
contested terms, but offer working definitions, subject to modification
in light  of the discussion which  follows:
(1) culture refers  to a way of life shared by a group; the way
of life  may be  constituted by various  factors  such  as  daily habits  of
meals  and  dress,  shared  and  often  unstated  assumptions,  a  shared
language,  shared  religious  beliefs  or  practices,  a  common  way  of
making life meaningful, a shared heritage or tradition, or a collective
1990]OSGOODE  HALL  LAW JOURNAL
intent to create  one.  There  may be conflict  and  disputes within  a
culture.  Membership  is determined  by the culture, through its own
rules and customs  regarding membership;6
(2) subgroup refers  to  a  group  living  or  working  within  a
larger  group  and  having  members  who  identify  themselves  as  a
distinctive enclave  or as otherwise  collectively  different from  others
in  the  larger  group;  a  subgroup  may  itself represent  a  culture  or
members  of  one  culture  that  have  moved  to  another  country  or
society where  other culture(s)  also  exist or predominate;7
(3)  tolerance is  a  political  and  psychological  stance  toward
varieties  of viewpoints,  customs,  and behaviours  that  signals passive
acceptance  and  allows  that variety  to exist without  interference  or
disapproval;
8
(4) respect  for cultural diversity is a more active demand  than
tolerance,  for  it may call  for accommodation  of subgroup  practices
and, therefore, changes  in dominant  institutions;9
(5)  federalism  refers  to  a  structure  of  governmental
relationships  that  permits  integration  among  different  levels  of
authority  without  absorbing  local  authorities  into  a  centralized,
superior,  or  higher  authority;  it  represents  simultaneously  the
diffusion of power and its concentration  in order to achieve common
or  shared  ends,  including  continued  respect  for  the  diffusion  of
power.
10
6 See  generally C. Geertz, Local Knowledge: Further  Essays in Interpretive  Anthropology
(New  York:  Basic Books,  1983).
7 There are  many  different  dimensions  of subgroup  identity, and  different  subgroups
differ  in  the  particular  constellation  of such  features  as  shared  history,  shared  language,
shared  religion,  shared  geographic  location,  shared  social  status,  and  shared  treatment  by
others.
8 See generally The Oxford English Dictionay.
9  For  cogent  statements  of  contrasting  positions  in  the  contemporary  debate  over
accommodation  in  the context  of the United States  Constitutional law and religion,  see M.W.
McConnell,  "Accommodation  of  Religion"  (1985)  Sup.  Ct.  Rev.  1;  M.  Tushnet,  'qhe
Emerging  Principle of Accommodation  of Religion  (Dubitante)"  (1988)  76  Georgetown  L.J.
1691.
10  Generally, see DJ. Elazar, ed., Federalism and  Political  Integration (Ramat  Gan, Israel:
Turtledove, 1979).
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Even  with  these  definitions  as  starting  points,  we  are  not
likely to understand how and where we agree  and  disagree without
further statements  of assumptions.  Let me start  by  explaining  my
assumption  that  preserving  distinctive  cultural  groups  is  a  worthy
social  and  political  goal.  I  understand  that  this  is  not  obvious.
Some  may  argue  a  contrary view  on  the  grounds  that many of the
groups  that  concern  me  are  traditional  and  out-dated,  especially
since  their  origins  in  pre-industrial  societies  predispose  them  to
frequent  clashes  with  the  economic  and  social  practices  of  an
industrialized and  even post-industrialized  world.  Other critics may
emphasize  the constant  risk of conflict  posed by  distinctive cultural
and  ethnic  groups.  From  their  perspective,  integration  and
assimilation are worthy goals as well as important means  to promote
peace.  Why,  then,  should  we  even  seek  to  protect  cultural
minorities?
From  the  vantage  point  of  a  cultural  minority,  preserving
cultural  diversity  is  a  matter  of self-preservation.  Diversity  here
becomes  a  code  word for  allowing  minority  groups  to retain  some
autonomy.  From the vantage point of majorities, why should cultural
diversity be valued?  For the majority, perhaps  it should be enough
that  members  of  minority  cultures  advocate  preserving  cultural
diversity, but this  argument  has never  been enough, practically,  nor
even  theoretically.  Nor  is this  goal  defensible  solely  in  terms of a
liberal commitment to tolerance,  and indeed, there are considerable
shortcomings in such a commitment as  a means to advance  the goal
of preserving opportunities for potentially intolerant subcommunities
to exist and grow.
I suggest three reasons why majorities  that are not composed
of traditional  subcultures should be interested in preserving cultural
diversity.  The first reason matches  the challenge presented not only
by  many  defenders  of  traditional  cultures,  but  also  by  many
contemporary  advocates  of  republicanism,  feminism,  and
communitarianism:11  they  criticize  political  systems  that  prize  only
individual  liberty  without  valuing  primary  group  identities.  They
argue  that diverse  subcultures  provide  settings  in which  individuals
11 See generally F. Michelman,  "Law's Republic"  (1988)  97  Yale  LJ.  1493;  S.  Sherry,
"Civic Virtue and  the Feminine Voice  in Constitutional  Adjudication"  (1986)  72 Va.  L. Rev.
543.
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can  develop  a  sense  of  themselves  through  their  membership  in
groups joined by common histories and common commitments.  For
many  people who  define  themselves  at  least  in  part  in  terms  of a
group  identity,  that identity  is both  chosen  and  found;  the  group's
"existence  and  relations  one  experiences  as  always  already  having
been." 12 Such a sense of self, constituted in membership, that is both
prior  to  the  self and  chosen  or  reaffirmed,  provides  a  basis  for
psychological  and social stability.
Secondly, multiple communities of meaning also provide some
check  against  a  kind  of  absolute  authority  structure  that  could
suppress  alternatives  with  grave  risks of totalitarian  power,  as  well
as  poor results.13   De  Tocqueville  was  not  the  first  or  the  last  to
note  how  intermediate  organizations  provide  important  buffers
between  the  individual  and  the  state,  and  diffuse  the  potential
tyranny of a centralized government  somewhat like a federal  system
of  government  itself,  with  its  multiple  levels  and  separation  of
powers.
14
Thirdly, in a real sense, tolerance and equality depend  upon
the  very  preservation  of differences  that  could  become  subject  to
tolerance  and  equal  treatment.  The  continuing  presence  of  the
other is  also  critical  for  oppressing  them,  as  Hegel  so  powerfully
explored  in  his  discussion  of  the  master's  need  for  the  slave.15
There  is no other  to oppress  if the master destroys  the slave.  But
a  more subtle need  for the other arises  in commitments  to  respect
12 See I.M.  Young,  "Five Faces  of Oppression"  (1988)  19 Philosophical  Forum 270  at
274.
13  Cf. P.  Chevigny, More  Speech: Dialogue, Rghts and Modem Liberty (Philadelphia:
Temple University Press, 1988) (arguing for justifications for free speech and  due process on
the basis of the philosophic, psychological,  and political  needs for dialogue).
14 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans.  H.  Reeve,  rev'd ed.  (New York:
Colonial  Press,  1899);  De Tocqueville  also  warned  against the tyranny  of the majority, and
subsequent  observers  have  commented  on  the  intolerance  enforced  on  those  pressed  to
conform.  See  L.  Hartz,  The Liberal Tradition in America: An  Interpretation of Amedcan
Political Thought Since the Revolution, 1st ed.  (New York:  Harcourt,  Brace, 1955)  at  55-56;
see also D.J.  Merritt, "1'he Guarantee  Clause and  State Autonomy:  Federalism  for a Third
Century" (1988)  88 Colum. L. Rev. 1  (discussing values  of federalism).
15 For a contemporary  elaboration  of his analysis, see J. Benjamin,  The Bonds of Love:
Psychoanalysis,  Feminisum and the Problem of  Domination (New York  Pantheon Books, 1988)
at 31-42, 51-84.
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differences  as  well,  even  in  the  course  of  articulating  one's  own
values.16   Despite these  reasons,  cultural  diversity  faces  increasing
challenges,  as the  next section explores.
II.  THEMES OF VARIATION:  CHALLENGES TO CULTURAL
DIVERSITY
fThe more perceptive [critics of liberalism] ... recognized in its espousal of tolerance
the  principal  threat  to  the  traditional  society  of  shared  values  and  community
integration. Robert  Paul  Wolff 1 7
We are both on to our oppression  and  tricked  by it.
Kate  Bartlett
18
Intolerance  by  official  governmental  acts  presents  obvious
threats  to  cultural  diversity.  When  the  Supreme  Court  of  the
United  States  directed  the  enforcement  of  state  laws  against
polygamy, it manifested "implacable hostility" to the Mormon religion
and  community.19   Even  more  virulent  forms  of  governmental
hostility  - or  majority  hostility  to  minorities,  channelled  through
governmental  acts  - appeared  in the United  States'  internment  of
Japanese-Americans  during  World War  I,20 and the United States'
and  Canada's  disregard  for the land  claims  of their native peoples.
Slavery  in  United  States  history  presents  a  tortured  strain  in  the
treatment  of  minorities  not  only  because  of  the  legacies  of
state-supported oppression, but also because of the legacies of racial
16  See ibid at 183-224  (exploring  ways to promote mutual recognition  between men and
women rather than patterns of domination);  J. Resnik, "Dependent Sovereigns: Indian  Tribes,
States and  the Federal  Courts"  (1989)  56 U.  Chi. L  Rev. 671.  In discussing respect  for the
sovereignty of Indian  tribes by federal  courts, Resnik notes that "[t]he degree of toleration  of
the 'other  sovereigns'  decisions  enables  the federal  government  to  make plain  what  its own
values  are" in a dialectic  interaction.
17 See Wolff, supra, note 1 at 34.
18  K.T. Bartlett,  Book Reviews of Feminism Unmodiflea. Discourses  on Life and Law by
CA. MacKinnon  and Real Rape by S.  Estrich  (1988)  13 Signs 879  at 885.
19 S.  Nanda  & J. Norgren, American Cultural  Pluralism  and Law (New  York:  Praeger,
1988) (discussing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145  (1878); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333
(1890);  Romney v. United States, 136 U.S.  1 (1890)).
20 See Korematsu v. United States, 323  U.S. 214  (1944).
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separatism  advocated  by  whites  who  sought  to  preserve  their
prerogatives.
Less  obvious  threats  to  cultural  diversity  arise  in  some
governmental  programs  that  espouse  tolerance,  in  others  that
ostensibly  pursue  aims  unrelated  to  either  promoting  or  harming
cultural  diversity,  and  in  still  others  that  pursue  policies  against
discrimination  or domination  even where  embedded  within  historic
cultural practices.
A.  Threats to Cultural Diversity From Limited Views  of Tolerance
and Equality
Governmental programs  embracing a commitment to equality
may appear to implement tolerance for persons with varied religious,
ethnic,  and  linguistic  backgrounds.  The  actual  interpretation  of
equality  used  in  designing  school  programs  and  employment
conditions,  however,  may impose one set of cultural norms  that fail
to  respect  and  may  even  undermine  other  cultural  traditions.  An
employer  may seek out employees  with  varied  cultural  practices  in
pursuit of equality and yet impose rules  for the workplace governing
dress,  diet, hours, or language  that constrain the  practices  or beliefs
of members  of a cultural  minority.  Sometimes,  legal challenges  to
such  rules  may secure judicial  protection for the  minority, although
usually without  the result of changing  the workplace  rules.
For  example,  a  series  of  decisions  by  the  United  States
Supreme  Court  have  required  state  unemployment  commissions  to
make  unemployment  benefits  available  to  members  of  religious
minorities  who  lost  their  jobs  because  the  workplace  rules  were
incompatible  with  their  religious  practices  or  beliefs.21   These
decisions  could  indirectly  convince  employers  to  change  their
practices in order to avoid increased levies  to support unemployment
benefits,  but  the  decisions  do  not  themselves  directly  alter  the
21 Sherbert v. Verner, 374  U.S.  398 (1963);  7tomas v. Review Bd of Indiana  Emplo7nent
Sec.,  101  S.  Ct. 1425  (1981);  Hobbie v.  Unemployment Appeals Com'n of Florida,  107  S.  Ct.
1046 (1987).  Some Canadian  cases  indicated demand for accommodation.  Re CNR Co. and
Can. Human Rights Com'n  [1983]  147 D.L.R.  (3d)  312 (Fed.  C.A.),  aff'd  on  other grounds
(1985),  [1986]  23 D.L.R. (4th) 481  (S.C.C.); Re Ontario  Human Rights Com'n and Simpsons.
Sears Ltd. (1985),  [1986]  23  D.L.R. (4th) 321  (S.C.C.).
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employers'  prerogatives  to  structure  the  workplace  in  ways  that
constrain  the practices  and  beliefs  of minority  groups.  When  the
government itself has been the employer  - in perhaps the sui  generis
situation of the federal military - requests to accommodate  minority
groups  have  proved  unavailing.22  Failures  of accommodation  are
hardly neutral  when  the  rules that themselves  differentially  burden
members of minority groups  are constructed without  them in mind.
A  form  of intolerance,  along  with  disrespect  for  cultural  diversity,
may arise in the  sheer adoption  and enforcement  of rules designed
by  and for  members of a dominant  group  that in effect  exclude  or
constrain  members of minority groups.23
The guise of tolerance may accompany school programs that
actually implement disrespect for cultural differences.  A school dress
code may lead school officials to bar  a student who wears  headgear
and long hair in violation of the regulations, but what should happen
when the student's appearance  reflects his membership in a subgroup
such  as  the  Sikhs?24   Failure  to  accommodate  such  subgroup
differences,  from  the vantage  point of the  minority student,  would
be  a  definite  interference  with  group  membership.  It would  also
matter little to that person if the school officials, and governing legal
authorities,  announce  that  discrimination  in  such  contexts  is
permissible  if exercised on bases other than racial differences.25
From  the  vantage  point  of  some  religious  and  culturally
conservative subcommunities, many school programs advance a liberal
social philosophy promoting tolerance for varied lifestyles  and beliefs
at the cost of undermining  the traditional values  preferred  by those
subcommunities.  In the United States,  this conflict  between secular
humanism  and fundamentalist subcultures  has  crystallized  around
22 Goldman v. Weinberger, 106  S.  Ct.  1310  (1986)  (the  free  exercise  clause  does  not
exempt  an  Orthodox  Jew, who  sought  permission  to wear a yarmulke  while on  active duty
as a military psychologist,  from Air Force dress regulations).
23  See  generally  M.  Minow,  "The  Supreme  Court:  1986  Term-Foreword:  Justice
Engendered" (1987)  101  Harv. L. Rev. 10.
24  See Mandla v. Dowell Lee,  [1983]  All  E.R.  1062  (H.L.);  H. Benyon  &  N.  Love,
"Mandla and  the Meaning of 'Racial  Group'" 100 L.Q. Rev. 120 at 348; see also Re Bhinder
and CNR Co., supra, note 21.
25 See D.G.T. Williams, "Aspects of Equal Protection  in the United  Kingdom" (1985)  59
Tul. L  Rev. 959  at 971.
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the treatment  of the topic of evolution  in public school  classrooms.
In  the  1920s,  fundamentalists  pushed  for  and  obtained  state
legislation  prohibiting the  teaching of evolution  in schools  receiving
tax  revenues.  The  prosecution  of  a  teacher  named  John  Scopes
under the Tennessee statute produced  a dramatic  lawsuit  that later
became the basis for books, plays, and movies.26  When the Supreme
Court of the  United  States  heard  a  similar  case  some  forty  years
later, it found a state statute forbidding the teaching of evolution to
violate  the  First  Amendment's  ban  against  the  establishment  of
religion.27  The Court reasoned that the statute adopted a particular
religious  viewpoint  and  its  enforcement  would  put  state  power
behind that viewpoint, in violation of the constitutional requirement
to separate church  and state.  Fundamentalists, however, believe that
school  instruction  in  evolution  and  silence  about the  biblical  story
of creation  amount  to  unconstitutional  interference  with  their  own
beliefs  and practices.
During  the  1970s  and  1980s,  members  of  these  groups
lobbied for  the  passage of laws  directing  any  teacher  who instructs
students  in  the  theory  of  evolution  to  also  provide  instruction  in
creation science,  a  curriculum  developed  by  fundamentalists  to
challenge  the  theory  of  evolution  from  their  perspective  while
studiously avoiding explicit discussion of the bible or a divine role in
creation.  Court  challenges  to  these  statutes  in  Arkansas  and
Louisiana have produced judicial decisions rejecting creation science
as  being  religious  in  purpose,  and  therefore  in  violation  of  the
establishment  clause  of the  First Amendment.2 8  This  entire story
may  seem  an  oddity  produced  by  the  combination  of  the  United
States'  constitutional commitment  to separate  church  and state, and
the use of state-supported  schools,  rather than religious  schools, by
26 See, e.g.,  I. Stone, Clarence  Darrow  for the Defense (Garden  City, N.Y.:  Garden  City,
1943);  Inherit  the Wind  (movie).  The trial  transcript  was published  under the  name, The
World's  Most Famous  Court Trial:  State of Tennessee v. John Thomas Scopes (1971).  The
Tennessee  Supreme  Court  in  essence  reached  a  compromise  decision  in  rejecting  the  fine
against Scopes  due to a  procedural  error while upholding the constitutionality  of the statute
forbidding  instruction in  evolution.  See  Nanda & Norgren, supra, note 19 at 124.
27 Epprson v. Arkansas, 393  U.S. 97  (1968).
28 McLean v. Arkansas Bd of Education,  529 F. Supp. 1255 (1982);  Edwards  v. Aguillard,
107  S. Ct.  2573  (1987).
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some  members  of  religious  minorities.29  Yet,  it  illuminates  the
conflict  between  ostensible  tolerance,  advanced  by  members  of a
secular,  liberal  community,  and  perceptions  of  intolerance  by
members  of  religious,  conservative  subcommunities.  Secular
humanism,  from  the  vantage  point  of  certain  religious
subcommunities,  is not  a solvent  of tolerance  for all  points of view
but  a  conflicting  belief  system  that  threatens  the  integrity  and
viability of their own culture.
30
Moreover, these debates highlight the contexts in which such
conflicts may be most pronounced: schooling and family prerogatives
about  raising  children.  When  it  comes  to issues  surrounding  the
acculturation of the next generation, even traditional liberals express
doubts  about  the  ideal  of  tolerance.  Perhaps  they  assign  their
doubts  to  the  view  that  children  are  not  the  sorts  of individuals
entitled  to toleration  for their own judgments;  children instead  are
presumed  to  lack  the capacity  and  competence  to  form their  own
views  and  need  the  guidance  of adults.  The  child  cannot  be  the
individual  accorded  respect because  the  lack  of confidence  in  the
child is the starting point for this problem.  But which  adults should
be  entrusted with  the power  to choose  for a  child?  Deference  to
any adult to make decisions about an individual child already departs
from  the  liberal  commitment  to  tolerate  unique  individual
29  Although the U.S.  constitution  has been  interpreted to require  states to give parents
the option to select  private religious schools for their children  (Pierce  v. Society of  Sisters, 268
U.S. 510  (1925)),  it would  counter many principles to direct that families seeking  to preserve
their  religious  identities  must  use  such  schools,  especially  since  the  ban  against  any  state
support for religion would  place the entire financial burden of such education on the parents.
30  This  challenge  has  been  made  even  more  explicit  in  recent  lawsuits  brought  by
fundamentalists who challenge the books and curricula used in public schools for implementing
"secular  humanism,"  which  they  charge  is  a  religion.  See  Smith  v.  Bd.  of  School
Commissioners,  655 F. Supp. 939  (D. Ala. 1987)  (ruling that specified  texts  imposed religious
ideas  of secular  humanism  that  offend  the  First Amendment  rights  of religious  plaintiffs).
This  decision  was  reversed  by  the  Court  of Appeals  that  reasoned  that  even  if  secular
humanism  is  a religion,  the textbooks  at  issue  did not  promote  it.  Smith v. Bd.  of School
Commissioners  of Mobile County, 827 F. 2d 684 (11th  Cir. 1987).  See also Mozert v. Hawkins
County Bd. of Education, 827 F. 2d  1058 (6th  Cir. 1987)  (rejecting  challenge to school texts
as  a  burden  on  religious  exercises);  Engel v.  Vitale, 370  U.S.  421  (1962)  (state  may  not
establish  a  religion of secularism  that  is  hostile  to  traditional  religions).  For a  defense  of
decisions  to  prefer liberal  culture  over the  objections  of fundamentalists,  see A.  Gutmann,
Undemocratic  Education  (paper  presented  to  Harvard  Law  and  Governance  Seminar,
(22  March 1989)  [unpublished].
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differences.  Parents provide the obvious  group to be entrusted with
power  to  make  decisions  about  their  child's  schooling  and
upbringing.  Yet, if the parents seem  disinclined  to prepare the child
for  participation  in  the  tolerant,  liberal  society,  traditional  liberals
may  be  reluctant  to  extend  complete  toleration  for  whatever  the
parents  select for the  child.
Some  advocates  of liberal  tolerance  go so  far  as to  criticize
fundamentalists  for  their  intolerance  toward  science,  toward
modernity, and toward the variety of viewpoints respected by liberals.
Of  course,  this  problem  looks  quite  different  to  fundamentalist
parents.  They view the  positions of secular  liberals  as  threatening
to - and intolerant of -- their ways of life.  They would not claim to
be neutral, but instead, they seek to announce and protect particular
values.31  Governmental  policies  to  promote  the  preparation  of
children for participation  in the dominant society may,  thus, appear
to  run counter  to the  beliefs  and practices  of minority groups  who
disapprove  of qualities  in the  dominant  society.  Even  decisions  to
require literacy in a language used by a majority in the country could
be  seen,  by  some  minority  groups,  as  a  threat  to  their  cultural
integrity.
3 2
In  light  of these  examples,  it  is valuable  to  reconsider  the
meaning  of  tolerance  and  intolerance.  Intolerance  surely  means
interference  with  a  given  viewpoint  or  practice;  it  also  means  a
refusal  to  accept  that  viewpoint  or  practice  as  something  that  a
person should be able  to adopt  and express.  Does intolerance  also
mean disapproval,  or disagreement  with  that viewpoint  or practice?
That cannot be the case, because  then tolerance  would  require the
suspension  of all judgments  and  all  disagreements.  And  yet, mere
noninterference  seems  inadequate  to  convey  the idea  captured  by
tolerance,  especially where  noninterference  occurs  within  a  context
31  Thus, when  fundamentalists  argue  for "balanced  treatment"  of theories  of evolution
and  theories  of creation,  they  do not  appeal  to  some  abstract  neutrality  but  instead  seek
recognition for their reference points - and a shift in  the reference points used  and promoted
in  the  schools.  Given  emerging  revisions  by  scientists  that  assault  traditional  views  of
evolution, see  SJ. Gotild,  Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History (New
York. W.W. Norton,  1989).
32  See  R.F.  Moran,  '7The  Politics  of  Discretion:  Federal  Intervention  in  Bilingual
Education"  (1988)  76  Cal. L. Rev. 1249.
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in which the viewpoint  or practice does  not conform to the majority
practices.  The majority may stigmatize, deride, or chill the adoption
of  minority  group  viewpoints  or  practices.  The  majority  may
undermine  the conditions  subgroups  need  to  preserve  in  order  to
flourish.  Apparently  equal  policies  that  nonetheless  fail  to
accommodate  the  differences  of  a  minority  culture  edge  toward
intolerance if those policies make expression or maintenance  of the
minority culture's views or practices  difficult or costly to members of
that group.  Thus, some governmental policies that aspire to equality
and  neutrality,  nonetheless,  may  be  experienced  by  members  of
majority  groups  in ways  that minority  groups  find  threatening  and
intolerant of their  culture.
Even  where  centralized  authorities  set  out  to  protect  a
notion of group  rights,  like the rights  of families  to preserve  their
mutual  relationships,  the very  conception  of the group  adopted  by
those  authorities  may  depart  from the  group's own  self-conception
and  impose  considerable  burdens  as  a  result.  For  example,  the
European  Commission  and European  Court  have largely  construed
family to mean nuclear units of parents and children.  This approach
neglects  or  undervalues  the  notion  of  the  extended  family  of
grandparents,  parents,  and  grandchildren,  or  aunts,  uncles,  and
cousins.  The state's  contrary  definition of family  may conflict  with
these families'  desires  to enter or remain in a  country where family
members reside, to obtain custody of children, or to define  family in
ways that depart  from the majority's  practices.33
B.  Threats to  Cultural Diversity Due to  Centralized Governmental
Policies
Some  governmental  policies  designed  to  secure  goals  quite
remote  from  the  treatment  of culturally  diverse  communities  may
nonetheless  seem  threatening  to  minority  groups.  For  example,  a
G.  Douglas, "The Family  and  the State Under the European  Convention  on Human
Rights" (1988)  2 Int'l J. L  Fain. 76.  See also Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S.  494 (1977)
(plurality opinion rejecting the  city zoning ordinance defining family to exclude a grandmother
living with two grandchildren who were offsprings of different  sets of parents); Village of Belle
Tere v. Boraas,  416 U.S. 1 (1974)  (upholding zoning restriction  that defined family to exclude
a group of unrelated  adults).
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governmental  plan to develop  natural resources  may run counter to
the cultural  or  religious  practices  of a  minority  group.34  Cultural
subgroups  may be disturbed by policies designed  to promote general
economic development by encouraging geographic and social mobility
for workers  and the skills necessary to promote such mobility.  The
European  Community  has embraced  such  policies to promote  both
the  greatest  possible  freedom  of  movement  for  the  factors  of
production  and  the  greatest  opportunities  for  success  for
individuals.35  Accompanying  such  policies  are  commitments  to
guarantee  individuals  the  right  to  pursue  an  occupation  and  to
protect those individuals against any infringements  by member states.
The  Community,  therefore,  bans  discrimination  on  the  basis  of
nationality  for  the  purposes  of  employment,  pay,  and  working
conditions,36  and  declares  the  right  of  individuals  to  move  freely
across  the  territories  of member states  and  to reside  in  any of the
member  states  to  pursue  employment.  Further,  the  Community
establishes  rights  for  the spouses  of such workers  to  set up  homes
in  any  of  the  member  states,  and  rights  for  the  children  to  be
admitted -to  "general  educational,  apprenticeship,  and  vocational
courses  under  the  same  conditions  as  the  children  of  national
workers."37   The  Community  also  establishes,  in  considerable
technical detail,  methods  for  aggregating  time worked  and benefits
earned under  social security systems  in member countries.38
Promotion of free mobility of workers  may appear to respect
diversity, and yet this set of policies  represents  two sets of potential
threats  to  cultural  diversity.  The  first  kind  of  threat  is  the  sort,
already  discussed  above,  that  can  arise when  the  interpretation  of
34See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetey Protective  Ass'n, 108  S. Ct.  1319 (1988).
35  See  Commission  of  the  European  Communities,  Thirty  Years of Community Law
(Luxembourg:  Office for Official Publications of the European  Communities, 1981)  at 285-86
(discussing  articles  48-51,  EEC Treaty,  Foundations  of the  Community (free  movement  of
persons)).
3 6See art. 48 (2),  EEC Treaty.
37 See Thirty Years of Community Law, supra, note 35 at 290 (discussing  article  12).
3 8 Art. 51, EEC Treaty.  See Keller  v. Caisse  regionale  d'assurance  vieillesse des travailleurs
salaries de  Strasbourg,  [1971]  E.C.R.  (II)  885;  Laumann  v.  Landesversicherungsanstalt
Rheinprovinz, [1978]  E.C.R. 805.
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equality excludes accommodation  for differences  between people or
groups.  If the commitment to treat workers who have travelled from
Italy the same as local German workers  involves  no accommodation
for  the  linguistic,  religious,  or  ethnic  differences  of  the  Italians,
equality will provide a sham guarantee  of mobility rights.  Requiring
the  workers  to  be  proficient  in  German,  for  example,  could  be
characterized  as  treating  all  workers  the same,  but  its  differential
impact  on Italian  and  German workers  will  undercut  the  vision  of
equal opportunity.  And even if a  given Italian worker is  proficient
in  German,  prohibiting  the use  of Italian  on  the  job  would  also
represent  a burden  on that  individual  and on the  cultural integrity
of his  group.
This very refusal to accommodate group differences has been
approved  in  the  United  States.  A federal  court  of appeals  ruled
that an employer had the power to establish English as the language
that must  be used on the job, despite a worker's claim that Spanish
was  not  only  his  native  language,  but  also  the  language  used  by
seven  out  of  eight  of  his  co-workers  and  by  75  percent  of  his
customers.39  The  employer  allowed  the  workers  to  use  Spanish
when  speaking  with  Spanish-speaking  customers,  but  not  when
speaking  with  Spanish-speaking  co-workers.  The  worker,  Hector
Garcia, had been discharged for violating the  English-only rule after
a  Mexican-American  co-worker  asked  about  the  availability  of an
item  requested  by  a  customer  and  Garcia  replied  in  Spanish.  At
trial,  Garcia introduced  testimony  that the  Spanish  language  is  the
most  important  aspect  of  ethnic  identification  for
Mexican-Americans.  Despite  a  federal  law  forbidding employment
discrimination  on the  basis of national  origin,  the court  concluded
that there is no right to speak any particular language while  at work
and that there was  no  evidence to establish  that an  atmosphere  of
racial or ethnic  oppression  prevailed  at that workplace.
This decision might be construed  as part of a  larger pattern
of  rules  designed  to  promote  national  unity  even  if  that  means
subordinating  linguistic  diversity.  If similar  kinds  of decisions  are
reached in Europe, problems may arise both in the unequal burdens
on individuals who are linguistic minorities in the nation where they
39 Garcia v. Gloor, 618  F. 2d 264  (1980).
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work, and the dangers  to the cultural  integrity of linguistic minority
groups.40  Failures to accommodate differences can implement  a kind
of intolerance  even if accomplished  under overarching  goals such as
national  unity,  or  mobility  of  labour.  Similar  failures  of
accommodation  for the spouses and children  of workers  from other
countries  could  carry  large  threats  to  the  viability  of their  distinct
cultural  identities.
A  second  danger  arises  from  the  sheer  inducement  to
dislocate  individuals  and  nuclear  families  from  larger  family  and
community  networks.  The  encouragement  of labour  mobility  will
itself disrupt patterns  of family  and community  ties  that cannot  be
reconstituted  once  disassembled.  The  devastation  of  cultures  by
natural  disasters  and  by  wars  gives  us  much  evidence  of  the
dependence of cultural identity on geographic and intergenerational
stability.  A lawsuit brought by members of a community  devastated
by a  natural disaster  successfully  convinced  an American  court that
the  loss  of  community  ties  itself  supported  enormous  damages,
despite  the  extremely  modest  monetary  value  of  the  property
destroyed.41
During  the  past  century,  the  United  States  witnessed
economic  policies  that  induced  dislocations  of  families  and
individuals.  Some  corporations  actually  direct  their  employees  to
relocate  in  order  to  achieve  promotions.  Periods  of  economic
difficulties  such  as  the Depression  of 1929  and  the  contemporary
period  of factory  closings  forced  many  relocations  of families  and
individuals.  Upwardly mobile Americans typically move to new areas.
Often,  as  a  result  of higher  education,  family  and  cultural  groups
become  dispersed.  How  much,  if at  all,  do  these patterns  reflect
deliberate  policies?
Some  have  argued  that  the  framers  of  the  American
Constitution contemplated  a reduction of local and regional loyalties,
even  as  they  expected  individuals  to  continue  partial,  lesser
40  Canada's  current  struggle  over  the  treatment  of linguistic  differences  provides  an
important  set of contrasts.  See  M. Minow, "Pluralisms" Conn. L. Rev. (forthcoming).
41 See K.T. Erikson, Eveything in Its Path:  Destruction  of Community in the Buffalo Creek
Flood (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976);  G.M. Stern, The Buffalo Creek Disaster:  The Story
of the Survivors' Unprecedented  Lawsuit (New York:  Random  House, 1976).
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affiliations based on family and local community ties.42  The framers
no  doubt  imagined  that  people  would  remain  closely  attached  to
religious  and  regional  identities,  and  would  secure  a  sense  of
personal  and  communal  stability  on that basis.  But, suspicious  of
groups with values  distinct from the values of the whole nation, and
distrustful of strong political affections  in general, the framers sought
to fragment  loyalties  by creating  multiple  sources  of authority  that
could each properly lay  claim to the attention of individuals. 43  The
framers  probably  never  imagined  the  continued  challenges  to  the
balance  they  sought  between  personal  attachments  to
subcommunities  and individual citizenship in the national community.
Largely  a  nation  of  immigrants  who  displaced  the  native
communities,  the United States  has  undergone repeated  migrations
with  some ethnic  and cultural  subcommunities  developing niches  in
particular  cities.  Indeed,  the initial  immigrations  of families  from
countries  outside  the  United  States  produced  gatherings  within
metropolitan  and rural areas  of people from the same home country
or  even  home  town.  Major  American  cities,  thus,  developed
enclaves  known  as Chinatown, Little Italy, or other names based on
the  national  or  ethnic  origins  of  the  group.  For  those  who
maintained  their  subgroup  identities,  a  route  toward  a  sense  of
national  identity could  be found  precisely  in joining so  many other
Americans who could claim some subgroup identity that distinguished
them from some unidentified majority. 4  Yet, after a first generation
spent in urban enclaves,  the second generations within  many ethnic
and  religious  groups  tended  to assimilate  in  the larger  culture,  and
move  away  from  the  cultural  enclave.45  Deliberate  programs  of
"Americanization"  designed  by  those  already  settled  in  the  United
States  pushed  newer  immigrants  to  assimilate,  to join  the "melting
42 See McWilliams, supra, note 3 at 296.
43 Ibid.
44 For  an  ingenious  argument  along  these  lines,  combined  with  useful  historical
information,  see R.L  Moore, Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans (New  York-
Oxford  University Press,  1986) and  its discussion, infra, Part  IV.
45 The experiences of black people and Native Americans,  in America  in this respect, as
in  many  other respects,  require  a  different  narrative  that would  emphasize  the  persistent
patterns of segregation  and  exclusion erected  and  maintained  by succeeding  generations of
white  immigrants.
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pot," in which  individual  and  group differences  merged  into  a  stew
softening  or  even  dissolving  those  differences.46  The  emerging
public culture emphasized both individualism - rather than religious,
ethnic, or other group affiliations  - and conformity to practices  and
values  cutting  across  all  groups  with  the  help  of mass  commercial
markets.47  Economic  centralization reduced  individual  attachments
to  local  neighbourhoods  and  communities.  People  pursued  job
opportunities  even  if that meant  moving across  the state,  or across
the  country.
By the second  half of the twentieth  century,  large  numbers
of the 50 percent of the population who attend college or university
programs  leave  their  families  and  communities  and  do  not  return
because  of the  economic opportunities  available  in  other  locations.
The  explicit  creation  of retirement  communities  for elderly  people
in locations  removed  from their families  and homes  further scatters
families.  Children  and  grandchildren  who  shed  the  ethnic  and
religious  identities  of their  families  is  a  familiar,  white  American
story.48  The story  includes  a  sense  of yearning  for what was  lost,
and a  search for some replacement  community  or group  affiliation,
sometimes  leading to fierce but short-term attachments to charismatic
figures  or  popular  trends,  or  an  effort  to  revive  what  the  last
generation gave up.  In addition, critics locate sources  of anomie and
alienation  in  the  creation  of  "shopping  mall  cultures"  and  the
replacement of local customs  by a homogenized,  television culture.49
Even  ethnic identities  may  in part  be taught by the  mass  media  to
people  who  lack  more  personal  experiences  with  their  different
heritages.
European patterns, until  recently, have been quite different.
True,  parts  of  European  history  surely  demonstrate  the  extreme
cruelties  of discrimination  and oppression  motivated  by animosities
by some ethnic groups towards others.  But the significance  of place
46 See R.H. Wiebe, The Search for Order (New  York- Hill  & Wang,  1967).
47  See McWilliams,  supra, note 3 at 303.
48 See generally  R.H. Bellah et al., Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Conmnitment
in American Life  (Berkeley:  University  of California  Press, 1985).
49 The original classic work on this subject is E. Durkheim, Suicide:A Study in Sociology,
trans.  G. Simpson & J.A.  Spaulding  (Glencoe,  Ill.: Free Press, 1951).
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or locale to most Europeans  is persistent.  The importance  of one's
identity as a Sicilian, or as someone from Turin, stems from a sense
of family, history, and continuity that has not changed much for most
Europeans  even in  the face of growing economic centralization.  It
may be worth considering,  nonetheless,  how the policies  promoting
free mobility of workers  could  push toward  some resemblance with
the  experiences  in  the  United  States.  Economic  practices  and
policies have recruited workers from various countries to leave their
homes and work elsewhere in Europe.  One observer comments that
"[t]he result  was to  create polyethnic  hierarchies  on  European  soil,  analogous  to
similar hierarchies which had existed in European colonial empires before the wars,
and  in  lands  of  European  overseas  settlement  from  the  moment  of  initial
immigration.  Thus we can say that Europe's proudest nations were catching up with
the rest of the world, willy-nilly - or sinking to its level,  if one values ethnic  unity
and  cultural cohesiveness more highly  than wealth and power."5 0
In  this  way,  governmental  programs  that  ostensibly  pursue  aims
unrelated  to either promoting  or harming cultural  diversity, such  as
policies  in  favour of economic  development  and  coordination,  may
disturb  patterns of cultural  diversity.51
C.  Threats to Cultural Subgroups Posed by Individual Rights
A final set of challenges to cultural diversity arises from some
governmental  policies  that  directly  assault  practices  internal  to
distinctive cultures by forbidding discrimination or domination on the
basis of gender, race, religion, or disability even where such practices
are  embedded  within  cultural  traditions 52   Here,  centralized
50 W.H. McNeill, Polyednicty and National Unity in World History (Toronto:  Univeristy
of Toronto Press, 1986)  at 69-70.
51 What kinds of policies could be devised to respect cultural differences or at least allow
subgroups  to  retain some  control  over their  own  identities?  For example,  policies  could
promote  geographic  movement  of cultural  subcommunities  as  an  ensemble  rather  than  as
individuals.  Especially since  return  to home  nations  is  not always  practicable or likely, the
challenge  for the host  country  is  to devise  modes for including  newcomers without  forcing
assimilation.
52 These antidiscrimination  norms appear in the United  States Constitution and  statutes
(such as Title VII), in the Canadian  Charter,  and  to some extent,  in current EEC law.  See
Council  Directive  of the  European  Communities  of  9  February  1976  (76/207/EEC)  and
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governmental  policies  directly  implement  the  liberal  vision  of  the
individual  as  the proper unit of analysis  and proper locus for rights
and  tolerance,  despite  contrary  cultural  traditions  that  treat  the
family  or the  social  group  as  the proper unit  of analysis  and  locus
for  tolerance.  One  conflict  over  a  liberal  norm  against  gender
discrimination  arises where the governmental authority offers jobs to
women as school bus drivers, but members of a religious community
refuse  to ride the  bus  on the grounds  that their community  would
not  allow  women  to  hold  such  jobs.  Another  arose  where  a
religiously-sponsored university faced the loss of its tax-exempt status
under federal  law because it refused  on religious  grounds  to permit
interracial dating among its students.53  Yet another conflict occurred
where a health club, owned by a religious organization,  dismissed  an
employee  who  had  lapsed  from  religious  observance.  The  statute
forbidding  employment  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  religious
identity  would  have  prevented  any  other  kind  of  employer  from
using  religious  observance  in  a  dismissal  decision,  but the  Supreme
Court  of  the  United  States  found  an  exemption  for  religious
organizations  from  this  ban  against  discrimination  compatible  with
the  Constitution.
5 4
In  each  of  these  cases,  a  direct  tension  arises  between
respect for  the  practices  and preferences  of a  subgroup  (organized
around cultural  identity or voluntary  affiliation)  and commitment  to
the  liberal value of nondiscrimination  on  the  basis  of gender, race,
generally  Council  of  Europe  Committee  of  Ministers,  Legal  Protection Against  Sex
Discrimination (1985).  See  also  European  Convention  of  Human  Rights  (on  gender
discrimination).
53 Bob Jones University v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983)  (rejecting the university's
claim  to tax-exempt  and  tax-deductible status).
54 Corporation of the Presiding  Bishop of the Church of Jes  Christ of Latter-Day Saints
v. Amos, 107 S.  Ct. 2862  (1987).  Recently, in the United  States, a similar set of tensions has
appeared in challenges to the discriminatory  practices of private clubs against racial minorities
and women under local or state laws protecting human  rights; see as examples, Board  of Dirs.
of Rotary Intern. v. Rotary Club, 107  S.  Ct.  1940 (1987);  Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 104
U.S. 3244  (1984).  See  generally D.L. Rhode, "Association and Assimilation"  (1986)  81 NW.
U. L. Rev. 106.  Different, but related, challenges  have been posed  to all-female and all-black
clubs and  colleges.  See  C.R.  Feldblum,  N.F.  Krent  &  V.G.  Watkins, "Legal  Challenges  to
All-Female Organizations"  (1986)  21  Harv. C.R.-C.L  L  Rev. 171.
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religion,  or  other  immutable  traits.55  Here,  a  threat  to  cultural
integrity may accompany enforcement of antidiscrimination principles
- yet arguments  for enforcing those  principles  may be weighty  and
even sponsored by many who otherwise favour sensitivity to cultural
differences 56  Enforcement  of antidiscrimination  principles  should
not be endorsed, however, without  at least noting and weighing the
cost  to  the  pre-existing  cultural  communities  whose
self-determination  and  integrity  may  be damaged  or undermined.57
Especially  where  intergenerational  issues  appear  - as  in  the
education  and  care  of children  - there  may  arise  direct  collisions
between  the  priorities of a subcommunity  and a  liberal concern  for
individuals,  apart  from their subgroup  identities.
In  sum,  threats  to  the  preservation  of  distinctive  cultures
may arise  in insensitive  applications  of equality norms  that burden
members of minority groups  by  treating  them  as  though  they were
the  same  as  members  of majorities.  A different  source  of threat
occurs  as centralized  authorities pursue  goals, such as national unity
or international  harmonization,  that  devalue  cultural  differences  or
prompt  geographic  dislocation.  A  final  threat  accompanies
enforcement of antidiscrimination  norms that challenge the contrary
rules  developed  within  some  cultural  traditions.  In  each  instance,
the  conflicts  arise  in  part  when  governments  treat  individuals  as
individuals,  rather than as members of extended families and cultural
and religious groups.  And in each instance, what may seem justified
on  a  theory of liberal  tolerance  may, to  a  minority group,  seem  to
be severe disrespect  for cultural  diversity.
III.  INTERRUPTION  AND  DISRUPTION  FROM  ANOTHER
PERSPECTIVE:  WHO  MIGHT  BE  OPPRESSED  BY
55 Similar issues arise when a company  owned  by citizens of a foreign nation refuses to
hire  women  or  insists  on  hiring  only employees  from  the  home  country,  and  then  does
business in  a country that bans  such  discrimination.
56 See  N.  Duclos,  "Canada:  Cultural  Diversity Through  Feminist Lens"  Buff. L  Rev.
(forthcoming).
57 See R.M. Cover,  Trhe Supreme Court,  1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and  Narrative"
(1983)  97 Harv. L. Rev. 4 (exploring the damage to private normative communities  caused by
governmental  control).
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PRESERVING DISTINCTIVE CULTURES?
You will also have to come  to terms with  the sense of alienation, of not belonging,
of having your world thoroughly disrupted, having it criticized and  scrutinized from
the point of view of those who  have been harmed  by it, having important concepts
central to it dismissed, being viewed with mistrust, being seen as of no consequence
except  as  an object  of mistrust. Maria  C. Lugones  and Elizabeth  V. Spelman58
As  the  author,  I  hope  you  have  been  nodding  with
agreement or willing suspension  of disagreement  up until now.  But
if you  have, I also worry.  I have  tried up  to this  point  to  imagine
how  liberal  norms  of tolerance  may  seem  disrespectful  and  even
threatening  to  minority  subgroups.  But  this  risks  taking  that
subgroup's  perceptions  not  just  as  a  starting  point,  but  as  the
endpoint  for  analysis.  It  also  risks  implying  that  members  of the
subgroups are in agreement,  and together, view all threats to cultural
integrity  in the  same way.  The  last set of threats  - threats  posed
by central governmental  commitments against  discrimination  on  the
basis of race, gender,  religion,  and other characteristics  - may well
seem as  harmful  to some members  of cultural  subgroups  as do  any
other  external  challenges.  But  because  I suggest  that  threats  to
cultural  integrity  due  to  antidiscrimination  policies  stand  on  a
different footing,  I think we  need  to change  course  in  the analysis
here.  Tolerance,  as  defined earlier,  is  a political  and  psychological
stance towards varieties of viewpoints, customs,  and behaviours,  that
signals  acceptance  and  that  allows  such  variety  to  exist  without
interference or disapproval.  If the burden of the last section of the
article was  to show that tolerance,  so  defined,  often requires  more
than mere noninterference,  the burden of this section  is to  suggest
that tolerance  is not  an unqualified  good,  and should be limited  in
the case  of viewpoints,  customs,  and  behaviours  that systematically
oppress  members of the group.
In  general,  it  is  often  useful  to  contrast  a  subcommunity's
desire  to  export  to  the  rest of the  society  those  of its  values  that
58  M.C. Lugones  & E.V.  Spelman, "Have We Got a Theory for You!  Feminist Theory,
Cultural  Imperialism  and  the Demand  for the 'Woman's  Voice"  (1983)  6  Women's Studies
International Forum  573 at 580.  Although this essay was written for white feminists as a call
to try understanding their exclusion from feminist  theorizing,  it suggests a method that could
be used  by other theorists who leave  out certain  people and their  perspectives.
[VOL  28 No. 2Tolerance Reconsidered
contradict the broader society's  own commitments, with its desire to
secure  space  free  from  intrusion  to  develop  and  perform  its  own
practices. 59  The  subgroup  is  often  better  able  to  persuade  the
majority  to allow it separate space than to convince it to accept and
implement  its  rules  - such  as  rules  about  marriage,  childrearing,
alcohol  consumption,  or  diet.  Therefore,  accommodations  that
exempt the subgroup from societal rules or that devolve authority to
the subgroup for self-governance over particular matters are familiar
and well-designed measures to implement tolerance while leaving the
dominant  culture  unchanged.60  The  subgroup  may  thus  secure
greater deference  in the name of autonomous  self-governance  than
it would if it sought to influence or control  the larger  society.
This  distinction does not work well when the group  seeks to
exercise  its  autonomy  in  ways  that  can  be  seen  to  discriminate
against  or  oppress  members  of  its  own  group  who  would  be
protected  by  antidiscrimination  principles  embraced  by  the  larger
society.61  When  a  religious  subgroup  implements  practices  that
systematically subordinate some of its members,  such  as women  and
children,  deference  to  the  self-government  and  autonomy  of the
group, from the vantage point of a liberal society, is not well-placed.
Indeed, this situation elicits several questions: Should the centralized
government's guarantees of individual rights against discrimination be
available to challenge those practices?  Should the secular courts, for
example, hear a dispute brought by a women  member of a religious
community who claims that her employment  contract with a church
school violates the law against sex discrimination  by requiring her to
resign if she becomes  pregnant?  And should the state's  courts be
available  to hear a challenge by a female member  of an Indian tribe
59
Carol  Weisbrod has  identified  two types  of legal rules  sought by  minority groups  in
search of protection for their religious interests.  The first is a search  for space to practice
their  own culture; the  second  is  the  effort  to inject  their preferred  practice as  the  rule  to
govern everyone.  See C. Weisbrod, "Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism
and  Religious Authority'  (1987-88)  26 J. Faro.  L  741.
60 See  Wisconsin v. Yoder,  supra, note  4.
61  A  fortiori, the .subgroup  has  even  less  likelihood  of persuading  the  general  society
that it should be permitted to adopt practices that involve devaluation of some other members
of the larger society, through  caste systems or intolerance toward  outsiders.  See Bob Jones
Universiy, supra, note 53.
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who objects  to the tribal  rules  about property, inheritance,  and the
status  of  children  because  they  deny  to  women  members  rights
accorded  to male  members? 62
The  problem  is  not  unusual.  Collisions  between  norms
against gender discrimination  and commitments  to cultural  diversity
arise  over  marriage  and  divorce  rules  that disadvantage  women  in
may subgroups.63  Some subgroup  views about  abortion collide with
women's  rights  of  reproductive  choice.64  Some  groups  perform
cliterectomies  on their  infant  girls  despite  state  laws  deeming  such
practices  child  abuse.  Others  promote  as  a  religious  rite  the
self-sacrifice  of a widow when  her husband  is  buried,  again  despite
governmental  laws  prohibiting  such  practices.  These  cultural
traditions justifying physical abuse of women and children  clash with
emerging  public policies  punishing such conduct.
There  are several  options  for  the secular,  public  authority.
It can  permit,  with varying  degrees  of affirmative  assistance,  access
to its  courts  and  agencies,  and enforce  general  public  policies  and
apply its  anti-discrimination  rules.  If this is the option selected,  the
state  officials  should address  whether  pursuing  this route, in effect,
requires  the  complainant  to  leave  her  community  and  face  its
rejection  because  of  her  disloyalty.65  If so,  this  option  becomes
largely subsumed by a second option: the state could work to assure
62 See  Resnik, supra, note  16  (discussing  Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez); Santa Clara
Pueblo was a  1978  U.S.  Supreme  Court  decision  refusing  jurisdiction  sought  by  a woman
member of a tribe who married a man out of the tribe.  Her children, therefore, were deemed
nonmembers  by the tribe.  She claimed  that  the federal  statute, the Indian Civil Rights Act,
imposes  limits on tribes similar  to those imposed on  the states by the Bill of Rights and  the
14th Amendment.  The Supreme  Court agreed,  but also concluded  that federal  imposition  of
remedies would  undermine  tribal  autonomy.  The Court  declined  to find  any implied  cause
of action that  would  allow the individual  complainant  to obtain  federal  court  review of the
discrimination  charge.
63 See T. Rostain,  "Permissible Accommodations  of Religion:  Reconsidering  the New
York  Get Statute,  (1987)  96 Yale L.J. 1147 (defending secular accommodation  for observant
Jewish  women who require a religious  bill of divorcement from  their husbands  to be  lawfully
divorced  under Jewish  rules but  whose husbands  may withhold  such  a document  under the
typical secular  law).
64 See, e.g., Brief for Amicus Curaie for American Jewish  Congress and thirty-five other
religious groups  in Reproductive Services v.  Webster, 662 F. Supp.  407 (1987).
65  See  A.O.  Hirschman,  Exit,  Voice,  and Loyalty:  Responses  to  Decline  in  Finns,
Organizations,  and States (Cambridge,  Mass.:  Harvard University  Press,  1970) at  96.Tolerance Reconsidered
the possibility of exit for any member of a subcommunity who seeks
it.  This would  be no minor matter, especially  since communicating
the possibilities  for exit  could  inject  the  state  into the educational
system of the subgroup,  and because simply providing this exit option
already changes  the meaning of the group  and of group membership
if the group has used metaphors of family, natural origins, or divine
command  to explain itself.66  At the same time, the exit option may
seem so  drastic that it provides  little  aid to  any member who views
it as  too great a sacrifice  to be traded  against an  individual  right.
As  a  third option,  the state  could require  the subgroup  to
establish  procedures  internal  to the  group  permitting  individuals  to
bring  claims  of  unfair  treatment.  The  state  could  even  impose
certain  substantive  norms,  such  as  a  ban  against  gender
discrimination,  while  leaving  it  to  the  subgroup's  own  governance
mechanisms  to  implement  those  norms.  This  approach  can  be
attacked  as  both  too  intrusive  and  not  intrusive  enough.  By
dictating requirements of participatory processes, individual hearings,
and norms of equality, the centralized  authorities would be invading
and possibly  changing  the core  elements  of a subgroup's  autonomy.
At  the  same  time,  by  leaving  interpretation  and  enforcement  to
those already in charge, the centralized authorities may be consigning
the individual  complainant not only to inevitable failure, but also to
the status of a resented renegade purveying the outside threat to the
subgroup's  integrity.  This option  is worth  considering,  however,  at
least  as an effort to acknowledge  that preserving distinctive  cultures
does  not mean preserving them  in amber, but instead allowing  them
to grow  and change  in  light of the  struggles  of their members  and
the pressures from outside challenges.
Each of these options explore what Hirschman has identified
as "exit" and ",oice."67  They appear against a backdrop  of presumed
loyalty  of  subgroup  members  to  their  group,  and  yet  the  very
66  Does  this  mandate  universal  exposure  to  educational  materials  prescribed  by
centralized authorities?  Are there less intrusive ways to provide an exit option for individuals?
Or could the commitment to protecting individuals within the subgroup  involve the centralized
government in prompting the subgroup itself to devise ways to change, ways devised by its own
members?  These are  the kinds of questions  unleashed  by attention to  the conflict between
cultural integrity  and individual  rights.
67 See Hirschman, supra, note 65 at 3-5.
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discussion of options like exit or voice makes  loyalty merely another
option, rather  than  the necessary  state  of affairs,  and  elevates  the
individual  and  her choices  as  the  important  unit  of analysis.  This
may be precisely what the subgroup's practices  are designed to avoid.
Thus,  if we  remain  in  the  framework  of  tolerance,  and  ricochet
between  the perspectives  of the dominant  societal  groups  and  the
subgroups,  there seems  to be no  answer, and no winning solution.
That cannot be right.  What  is missing is an acknowledgment
that it is  impossible to be neutral  in the struggle between  points  of
view and a normative commitment.  What  is  missing is a substantive
theory, a  theory of oppression.  This notion  of oppression raises the
issue of power  implicit  in  the competition  between  points  of view
about tolerance.  The very idea of tolerance as putting up with those
one  does  not  like  depends,  implicitly,  on the  view that  those who
put  up  have  the  power  not  to,  have  the  power  to  reject,  or
stigmatize,  or  oppress  the  others.  The  notion  of  oppression  also
serves  as  a  meeting  ground  between  a  commitment  to  preserve
distinctive  cultures  and  a  commitment  to  implement  laws  against
gender  discrimination.  Both commitments are efforts  to resist what
otherwise  would  be  the  likely  course  of  events  by  dint  of  the
distribution  of power:  the  subgroups would  risk domination  by  the
majority, and women - given their historical treatment by multitudes
of cultural  and  religious groups  - would  risk degradation or  misuse
by men.68
In  a recent  article, Iris  Marion Young offers  an elaboration
of oppression  as a concept to be applied to actual social situations. 69
"[O]ppression  is the inhibition of a group through  a vast network of
everyday  practices,  attitudes,  assumptions,  behaviours,  and
institutional  rules."70   She  suggests  five  possible  dimensions  of
63 Interestingly,  it is possible that  some subgroups  historically provided  greater  equality
between  men  and  women  than  does  dominant  Western  society  - and  contact  with  this
dominant  society  exacerbates  gender  inequality.  See S. Deutsch,  "Women and  Intercultural
Relations:  The  Case  of  Hispanic  New  Mexico  and  Colorado"  (1987)  12  Signs:  Journal  of
Women  in  Culture  in  Society  719 at 737  (Hispanic  men  and  women  settling  in  the Anglo
north  suffered  from  narrowed  opportunities,  and  women's  opportunities  suffered  a decline
compared  to men's; women also  became more marginal within  the Anglo settings).
69  See Young, supra, note 12.
70 Tbid. at 275.
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oppression.  Because  they  enable  contrasting  insights  into  the
collisions  between  preservation  of  distinctive  cultures  and  norms
against gender  discrimination,  I examine  them here in detail.
First, Young identifies exploitation  as  the "domination [that]
occurs  through a steady process of the transfer of the results of the
labour  of some people  to benefit others."71  One of the intriguing
qualities of this dimension is its ambiguity about the scope of labour:
does  it  include,  as  feminist  theorists  have  advocated,  reproductive
activities?  If not, the concept  may systematically  devalue  women's
contributions  to  a  family;  if  so,  the  concept  may  be  useful  in
evaluating  a problem such  as the patrilineal rules of an Indian  tribe
or  the  restrictions  on reproductive  choice  imposed  by  a  particular
subgroup  contrary to the dominant  society's position.
Second,  Young discusses  marginalization  which  denotes  the
ways  that  an  individual  or  group  may  be  expelled  from  useful
participation  in  social  life,  citizenship,  and  productivity.72  If  the
subgroup  systematically  excludes  women  from  participation  in  its
social  life,  its  governance,  and  its  productive  activities,  should  we
conclude  that  it  oppresses  women?  This,  too,  is  a  complicated
question.  The very definition  of social life  - and of people's  roles
in it - may vary by subgroup,  and gender-based  roles are so familiar
in social activities  that notions of equality have proved  slippery  and
divisive.  On  the  issues  of  political  governance  and  productive
activities,  gender  based  exclusions  could  well  be  examined;  if
demonstrated,  a  case  for  gender-based  oppression  could  be
supported.73  For example,  the  Jewish requirement  that a  husband
grant  a  wife  a  religious  bill  of  divorcement  before  she  may  be
considered properly divorced under religious law could be interpreted
as  a  gender-based  exclusion,  especially  if it means  that women  are
systematically  excluded  from remarriage  within the  religion  simply
71 Ibid. at 278.
72 Ibid. at 281.
73 Internal  challenges,  brought  through  internal subgroup  procedures,  to  the exclusion
of women  from positions as religious officials, already suggest how some subgroup governance
and participation  practices have been drawn along gender  lines, to the disapproval of growing
numbers  of women  who consider  themselves loyal  group members.  Thus,  efforts to ordain
women as ministers, priests, and rabbis have produced conflicts, and sometimes change within
particular religious groups.
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due  to  the  refusals  of their  husbands  to  follow  this  religious  law
while  securing  a secular divorce.
Young's  third dimension  of oppression is powerlessness;  she
defines  it with  a special focus on the contrast between professionals
and nonprofessionals  in societies  that accord  to professionals  much
greater  autonomy and opportunity  for creativity  in their work.74  A
more  general  meaning  of powerlessness  could  also  be  pursued  in
exploring the possibilities of oppression against women by subgroups.
A  sophisticated  study  of the  practice  of Sati - self-sacrifice  by  a
widow at the  funeral  of her husband  - suggests  that  this  practice
offers  a  venerated  position  for  the  woman  who  chooses  it;  she  is
deemed  to  escape  the  lowly  spiritual  status  usually  assigned  to
women  and  to offer spiritual benefits  to  her family and  community
by  choosing  this  act.75  Indeed,  the  practice  can  be  considered
oppressive only in  light of the larger question,  what kind  of society
would create  so  few options  for veneration  for women  that suicide
upon the death of the  husband would  be  a  desired opportunity?
Next,  Young  introduces  the  notion  of  cultural  imperialism
as  "the  experience  of  existing  with  a  society  whose  dominant
meanings  render  the  particular  perspectives  and  point  of view  of
one's own  group invisible  at the same time  as they stereotype  one's
group  and  mark  it  out  as  the  Other."76   Young  expressly  cites
women  as  likely  to  be  subjected  to  this  experience,  and
contemporary  debates  about  women's  status  in  cultural  forms,
academic  disciplines,  and political discourse  may support the  charge
of  imperialism  against  women  by  the  dominant  society.  Yet,
assessment  of the  treatment  of women's  experiences  in  subgroups
may reveal  that women  are  not oppressed  by the Amish,  or other
culturally  distinctive  groups,  and  it  will  be  difficult  to  determine
whether  any  outsider  can  fully  understand  women's  experiences  in
such  subgroups.  The  concept of oppression  on  this  basis  may still
be  relevant,  however,  if women  who  are  members  of  a  subgroup
See Young, supra, note 12  at 283.
75 V.N. Datta, Sad: A Historical Social and  Philosophical  Enquiry Into the Hindu Rite of
Widow Burning (New Delhi:  Manohar Publications,  1988).
76 Young, supra, note 12 at 285.
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themselves  claim  that  their  experiences  are  rendered  invisible  or
stereotyped  by their own  group.
Young's  final  dimension of oppression  is  systemic  violence,
directed on the basis  of group membership.77  Feminist  analyses  of
rape  and  pornography  in  dominant  Western  culture  maintain  that
these  are  instances  of oppression  manifested  as  systemic  violence
against women.  Some also argue that efforts to regulate and restrict
abortion  represent  systemic  violence  against  women  by  exposing
women to  risks of illegal  and dangerous  abortions or by constraining
women's control over their bodies.  These are challenging  arguments
that  redefine  violence.  Perhaps,  instead,  a  different  quality  of
oppression  should be articulated  to convey the point.
Indeed, Young's conception of oppression  is only one initial
point of departure in what I hope will be a sustained scholarly effort
to  give  meaning  to  the  concept.  Studies  of  the  sources  of
oppression  from economic  and social structures would be important
for this effort.  Work by scholars on these subjects seldom enters the
discourse  of  lawyers  and  judges.  Devising  ways  to  talk  about
oppression  will  be  critical  to  any  effort  by  law  to  take  tolerance
seriously.  Part  of this  effort  must  include  a  search  for  means  to
resist  becoming  a  party  to  oppression  in  the  very  critique  of
oppression.  As  Susan  Griffin  has  written,  theories  of  liberation
begin  as efforts  to articulate  feeling of oppression,  and they restore
to the oppressed  a belief in  the self and  in  the authority  of the self to determine
what  is  real....  But  when  a  theory is  transformed  into an  ideology,  it  begins  to
destroy the self and self-knowledge....  It organizes  experience  according to  itself,
without touching experience....  It  is annoyed  by any detail which does not  fit into
its world view.  Begun as a cry against the denial  of truth, now it denies  any truth
which does not fit into its scheme.  Begun as a way to restore one's sense of reality,
now  it attempts to  discipline real  people, to  remake  natural beings  after  its own
image.  All  that  it  fails  to  explain  it  records  as  dangerous.  All  that  makes  it
question,  it regards as its enemy.  Begun as a theory of liberation, it  is threatened
by new theories of liberation;  slowly, it builds a  prison for the mind.
78
The very method of inquiry into oppression must not become
intolerant of challenges.  The  tension between  admirable  tolerance
77 Aid. at 287.
78 S. Griffin, "The  Way of All  Ideology"  (1982) 7  Signs:  Journal of Women  in  Culture
in  Society 641  at 648.
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and despicable oppression has long persisted.  Thus, it should not be
surprising  that  a  recommendation  for  the  optimal  public  policy  to
resolve  the tension cannot be  made.  The struggle  to  give content
to  the  criteria  of oppression  will  require  participation  by  the  very
people who experience  it in  countless ways.
IV.  CONCLUDING:  A BEGINNING
Lo and behold, here in our midst is dissimilarity that simply could not be squelched,
and  that now  is  insisting on its right  to flourish. Jane Jacobs 79
We have  to learn to tolerate  questions. Susan  Griffin6 0
This  article  began  by  advocating  commitments  to  preserve
distinctive  cultures.  This  means  reconceiving  tolerance  to  include
the vantage  point of members  of traditional  subgroups  that  do  not
share  the  dominant  liberal  commitments  to  individual  choice,
experimentation,  and  value  relativism.  Arguments  were  made  in
favour  of gender  equality,  although,  in  many  instances,  this  runs
counter to the practices  of traditional  cultures  and religious  groups.
Together, these  arguments  pose a  question:  What  mix of concerns
for  group  rights  or  cultural  preservation,  on  the  one  hand,  and
individual  rights and freedoms,  on  the other, should a given  society
pursue  if it  hopes  to  respect cultural  diversity without  colluding  in
the domination  or oppression of some of its own  members?
Yet, even  this question makes  the problem look too simple.
There  remain  urgent  needs  for  larger  structures  of  political
organization,  economic  co-ordination,  and  communication  and
ideology for ordering  relationships  among subgroups,  and providing
methods  for  articulating  and  resolving  conflicts.  Global  markets
drive  political  centralization  and  co-ordination  efforts.  Nations
within  large  sectors  of the  world  have  come  together  for  mutual
support  in part  to  counter  competition  across such  sectors,  and  in
79  J. Jacobs,  The  Question  of Separatimn..  Quebec  mid  the  Struggle  Over  Sovereignty
(Toronto:  Random House,  1980) at 115.
80 See Griffin, supra, note 78 at 659.
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part  to provide  larger  contexts within  which  to order  relationships
among  subgroups  as  well  as  to  define  and  handle  the  kinds  of
conflicts  that  could  spell  war.  The  allocation  of  governmental
powers between  levels  and among  branches  of governments  - and
between nations and continents  - poses  a difficult enough question
when  economic  and  military  concerns  are  most  salient.  When
combined  with  the  paradoxes  and  dilemmas  of  tolerance,  these
central questions of political design are enormously complicated, and
comparisons  of historical  experiences  suggest  that  no  determinate
mix  of  powers  is  significantly  better  than  another  in  preserving
distinctive cultures  or enforcing  individual rights.
The problems of tolerance and intolerance increase with the
lack  of  coincidence  between  territorial  boundaries  and  cultural
boundaries.  Geographical boundaries  fail to match  up with cultural
boundaries  as  nation  states  form  and  reform with  boundaries  that
encompass  members  of  many  different  cultural  groups,  and  as
members  of different  cultural  groups  move  to nation  states  where
they  have  not  previously  lived.  One  observer  commented  that
"[t]here  are  thousands  of  ethnic,  tribal,  racial,  lingual  and
ethno-religious communities" while "there are only about 150 'nation'
states, within  which  heterogeneous  groups  coexist."8
Given this diversity of cultural groupings within nation states,
there are historic and persistent demands  for self-governance  by local
and  regional  authorities  that  claim  greater  identification  with  and
responsiveness  to their particular  cultural groups  than to the central
authorities.  Yet, some groups  remain  minorities  even  at  the local
and  regional  levels.  They  may  find  more  protection  for  their
interests  - more  promise  of tolerance  - if a  centralized  national
government  retains  control.  Still  other  groups  may  believe  that
international  accords  better  assure tolerance,  perhaps  because  they
represent  cultures  that  are  minorities  in  their  own  country  of
residence, but  majorities  elsewhere,  or perhaps  because  the  norms
developed  in  international  accords  better  recognize  their  rights  or
81  . Duchacek, "Federalist Responses  to Ethnic Demands: An Overview"  in DJ. Elazar,
ed., Federalism and  Political  Integration, (Lanham, MD: University Press of America,  1984) at
59.
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needs8 2  Some  groups  may  discover  that  no  particular  form  of
official  policy  within  a  nation  provides  protection  for  cultural
autonomy,  self-governance,  or  basic  human  rights;  they  may  find
more  promising  assistance  in  the  sphere  of  international  human
rights.  The  Native American  experience  in  the United  States  may
provide  such  an  example.  Perhaps  no  greater  variety  of theories
about  federalism  has  appeared  in American  jurisprudence  than on
this  topic;  from  co-ordinate  sovereigns,  to  dependent  nations,  to
wards  protected  by  the  nation-state,  or  to  individuals  with  some
special claims, Native  Americans  have  witnessed  administrators  and
judges  persistently  denying  the  power  and  entitlements  of  these
culturally  distinctive groups.
The variety of governmental  relationships,  connecting  local,
regional,  national,  and international  authorities,  carry both  promise
and  threats  to  cultural  diversity.  In the  abstract,  it is  not  obvious
that  any  particular  allocation  of  responsibility  among  levels  of
government  will  assure  more  tolerance  for  cultural  diversity  than
any  other.  Contextual,  historical  inquiries  can  provide  some
illumination  of the  consequences  of varied  patterns of relationships
among local,  regional, national,  and international  authorities  for the
preservation of cultural diversity.83  In part, such inquiries replay the
contrast  between  the  liberal  conception  of  individual  rights  and
alternative  notions  of  group  identity.  For  example,  a  linguistic
minority  may  find  support  from  the  central  government  for  its
bilingual  schools,  or, in  another  political  context,  local  control  may
prove  more  hospitable for  the minority.  Different cultural  groups,
at  different  times,  have  found  more  help  through  one  of  these
82  Carol  Weisbrod  is  writing  a  book  that  should  remind  us  of  the nongovernmental
sources of authority.  These  sources  remain vital and  in  a superior  competitive  position  for
many  cultural  and  religious  groups that  view secular  governmental  authority  as simply  one,
inferior source of rules.  See C. Weisbrod, Toward a History of Essential Federalism: Another
Look  at Owen  in  America  (1989)  [unpublished].
83 See, e.g., J.M.  Balkin,  "Federalism and  Conservative  Ideology" (1987)  19  Urban  Law.
459  (exploring  the historic, rather than inherent,  link between  the notion of state's  rights and
conservative  ideologies  in the United States); R.H. Fallon, 'The Ideologies  of Federal  Courts
Law" (1988)  74 Va. L. Rev. 1141  at 1146-47  (noting  political alignments and deep ideological
structures  of  thought  associated  with  preferences  for  state  sovereignty  compared  with
preferences  for national  authority in the United State's jurisprudence of federal court power).
See  also  Minow,  supra, note  40  (comparing  the  United  States  and  Canada  in  terms  of
federalism  and  minority  group experiences).
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conceptions  over  the  other,  and  different  levels  of governmental
authorities  have  similarly  found  varied  reasons  for  adopting  one
rather than the other.
In short, the tensions and  paradoxes  explored  in this  article
do  not  suggest solutions.  Indeed,  one  of its purposes  is  to argue
that solutions are likely to neglect the multiple perspectives on issues
of tolerance, cultural diversity, and allocation of governmental power.
The  search  for  an  answer  is  so  often  stymied  by  the  faulty
assumption  that the right question has been asked.  What questions
are  right profoundly  reflects  the point of view of the inquirer,  and
this  fact  can  bedevil efforts  to get beyond  the  acknowledged  limits
of one point of view.  "How can a society promote tolerance?" is  an
inadequate  question  not  only  because  tolerance  leads  to  passive
acquiescence  to  existing  power  arrangements  rather  than
accommodating  or respecting differences, but also because tolerance
risks  undermining  subgroups  committed  to  particular  values
inconsistent with majority practices.  Yet, there are comparable faults
in  a  question  such  as  "how  can  a  society  respect  and  preserve
cultural  diversity?"  because  that formulation  obscures  the potential
tension  between  preserving  some  subcultures  and  promoting
individual  rights that  may be undermined  by those very  groups.
An underlying  problem  in  both questions  is  the  pretence
that  the question  can  be asked without  a  point of view.  It  is  also
no solution for a complex society to simply embrace an existing point
of view  in  order to address  questions  about  tolerance  and  cultural
diversity.  The  challenge  is  to formulate  an inquiry  from  a point of
view  that  can  acknowledge  other  points  of  view  and  their
differences.  Once pursued, such an  inquiry cannot be neutral.  It is
for that reason  that I advocate  explicit  attention  to the concept  of
oppression,  even  though  that  concept  will  inevitably  invite  debate
over its  meaning  and  its  application.  Respecting  cultural  diversity
while also pursuing  basic liberal  freedoms  and individual rights must
be  an  ongoing  struggle  among  people  who  disagree  about  many
things.  In the spirit of such a struggle, scholarly and political efforts
to  define  the  notion  of  oppression  must  be  pursued  by  people
holding  different  points  of view.  The search  is  for  a  language  to
talk  about  pain  and  powerlessness  while  acknowledging  the
incommensurability  of experiences  and,  indeed,  the  impossibility  of
producing a  language with  universally shared  meanings.
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What  combination  of  large  structures  and  primary  group
identities  can  provide  latitude  for  individual  freedoms,  respect  for
historically different subcommunities, and co-ordination  of economic
and political institutions  and activities  across locales, regions,  states,
and  nations?  Varied  versions  of  federalism  - relationships  that
simultaneously  recognize  the  demands  for  centralization  and  the
needs to decentralize  - provide  promising models  for responding  to
this large  question. 84  At the same time, I  suggest,  there is nothing
peculiar  to a  federal  system  that exacerbates  or eases  problems  of
preserving cultural diversity.85  Within particular  time periods, within
particular constellations of relationships  among levels of government
and  between  cultural  groups,  arguments  for  and  against  greater
centralization  or greater  decentralization  provide  avenues  for both
protecting  and  undermining  cultural  diversity.  Historically,
centralized  governmental  authority  has  been  linked  to  the
development  and articulation of individual rights which may become
corrosive  to  particular  cultural  traditions  while  advancing  the
freedom  and  self-realization  of each  person.  There  may  be  ways,
however,  that centralized  governments  can  protect  subgroups  from
intolerant  policies  of  local  authorities.  Yet,  whatever  level  of
government  retains  control  of any  given  issue,  there  will  persist  a
tension  between  the  basic  rights  of  individuals  to  be  free  from
discrimination  on  the  basis  of  immutable  traits  and  respect  for
subgroups  thus  enabling the preservation  of cultural  traditions.
What  may  be  most  important  is  simply  the  existence  of
multiple  levels  of governmental  authority.  It  is  the  presence  of
multiple  authorities  that,  paradoxically,  gives  minority  groups  the
opportunity  to  seek  alternatives  to  a  singular  answer.  Robert
Cover's work  on the values of jurisdictional  redundancy provides  an
eloquent defense of the multiple court systems  in the United States.
These systems increase the chances that errors will be corrected, and
84 See  Minow, ibid.
85 A compatible view is developed in R.B.  Cappalli, "Restoring Federalism Values in the
Federal  Grant  System"  (1987)  19 Urb.  Law.  493 at 510:  "[Wihile  federalism  cannot  be  a
power switch,  perhaps  it can  be a fine-tuner within  the politically determined  structures  and
nation-state allocations  of authority existing at any given  moment."
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ultimately  allow  less  powerful  voices  the  chance  to  be  heard8 6
Thus, governmental  powers  should be allocated  to multiple sources
of authority  in  an  effort  to  enhance  the  avenues  for  challenging
public and private  intolerance.
The  challenge,  from  this  vantage  point,  is  to devise  modes
of inquiry that can solicit multiple  perspectives rather than suppress
them.  At  the  same  time,  a  further  challenge  is  to  construct
structures of governance  that can acknowledge legal pluralism - the
variety  of sources  of  authority  that  include  religious  and  cultural
practices  outside  of  the  governmental  hierarchy  of
local-national-international  authority  - and  still retain  some  ability
to  govern  with  coherence8 7  What  mix  of  respect  for  multiple
authorities  and demands  for singular authorities  can provide for the
conflicting demands of order and freedom yet also elicit respect and
solicit  assent  from  people  with  differing  backgrounds  and
assumptions?88  Further, what other questions  should be framed  to
reflect  the  views  of  those  historically  unrepresented  in  dominant
legal discourse?
I close with  three images  that may assist future discussion  of
these issues.  The first comes from Marge Piercy's novel, Woman on
the Edge of Time. 8 9  The book combines  two stories.  The first  tells
of a  poor  woman  of colour who,  through  a  series  of misfortunes,
finds  herself in a mental  hospital where she  is repeatedly subjected
to shock treatments.  The second story concerns either the delusions
of this  woman,  or the  utopia  she  periodically  escapes  to,  only  to
return  to  the mental  hospital.  In  the  utopia,  the  main  character
views many intriguing contrasts with contemporary American society.
For example, children are born only through test tubes; parents  sign
up for the opportunity, and thus, parents and children are commonly
86  R.M.  Cover,  'The  Uses  of  Jurisdictional  Redundancy:  Interest,  Ideology,  and
Innovation"  (1981)  22 Win.  & Mary L  Rev. 639.
87 Some would  argue in  favour of some  recognition  of legal  pluralism,  and  subgroup
autonomy, in part because cultural subgroups within a country may provide a vehicle for better
democracy given  the limits of direct democracy.  See Wolff, supra, note  1.
88 See  generally  G.W. Carey, ed.,  Order,  Freedom, and the Polity: Critical  Essays on the
Open Sociey (Lanham,  Md.:  University  Press of America,  1986).
89 M. Piercy, Woman on the Edge of Tine (New York:  Alfred A.  Knopf, 1976),
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of  different  races  and  backgrounds.  Upon  reaching  adolescence,
every  individual  changes  parents  and  goes  to  stay  with  a  new
guardian  who  shepherds  the  person  through  that  transition  to
adulthood.  In  addition,  equality  on  the  basis  of  gender  is
unhampered  by gender differences  in child-bearing and child-rearing.
More  to  the  point  of  the  topic  of  tolerance,  this  society
confronted  the  issue  of how  to preserve  distinctive  cultures  while
avoiding the historical stigmas  and status differentials  associated with
groups  that were  less  powerful.  The  society  decided  to  preserve
traditional groups, and promote the development  of new groups, but
made group membership  entirely voluntary.  An adult  could  choose
to  join  any  group,  such  as  a  group  devoted  to  preserving  the
traditions  of  the  Iroquoian  Indians,  or  a  group  interested  in
exploring  and  revising  Reformation  Protestantism.  A  child  would
participate in the group chosen by his parent, or the multiple groups
chosen  by  his multiple  parents.  Upon reaching  adolescence,  he or
she could try any group available.  In this way, the society maximized
exit options  by maximizing entry options.  Thus, the society avoided
converting  all  cultural  traditions  into  mere  museum  artifacts  or
shopping-mall  displays  of fashions  and foods.
The  second  image  comes  from  an  intriguing  book  by R.L.
Moore  called  Religious Outsiders and the Making of Americans.90
The  book explores  how each  religious  group  in America  helped  to
forge  American  history,  and  how  each  group,  through  time,  has
cultivated  the  idea  of  itself  as  an  outsider  to  American  culture.
Thus, leaders  of the Mormon Church explicitly elaborated narratives
of  oppression  in  part  to  strengthen  this  sense  of  group  identity.
American  Jews,  as well,  created  these  narratives,  building  on  long
traditions  of  external  oppression  and  internal  stories  of  chosen
uniqueness.  American  Catholics  decided  to preserve the ethnic and
national differences  of immigrant Catholic groups, and were thereby
assured  multiple  meanings  of outsider  status  in  American  culture.
As Moore  explores  this  theme in the history of Christian Scientists,
Black Protestants, Fundamentalists,  and early Protestant  settlers, he
suggests  how  "[r]eligious  struggles  engage  people  in  elaborate
strategies  that  on  each  side  entail  affirmation  and  denial,
9 0 Supra, note 44.
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advancement  and  repression,  of  a  set  of  cultural  options.'9 1
Similarly,  most  Americans  gained  a  sense  of  being  American  "by
turning  aspects  of a  carefully  nurtured  sense  of  separate  identity
against  a  vaguely  defined  concept  of  mainstream  or  dominant
culture."92  Although  he does not claim  that this  creation of stories
about  marginality  explains  the  relative  peace  found  in  the United
States  despite  enormous  religious  heterogeneity,  Moore's  account
suggests that some forms of tolerance  may be promoted if everyone
feels  somewhat  marginal.93
The final image,  parochial  as  it may be, is  of a  law school.
Imagine  a  law  school  that  has  celebrated  its  commitments  to
tolerance,  demonstrated  by  its  inclusion  of  people  of  varied
backgrounds  and political viewpoints as  students and faculty.  It has
representatives of racial, religious, and ethnic minorities, and as large
a percentage of women  as any other law school.  Imagine that some
of its more unusual  faculty members begin to write articles and teach
courses  that are deliberately  not in the mainstream.  Some talk  of
feminism,  others  talk of multi-culturalism;  some talk of economics,
others  of semantics  and  semiotics.  Some  of the  more  traditional
members  describe  their  feelings  of rejection  as  the  newer  faculty
members deprecate traditional work.  Some of the traditionalists talk
increasingly about the danger of declining standards and the need to
re-establish  standards  by  denying  someone  tenure.  Indeed,  in  a
spectacular and prolonged battle, a woman is denied tenure.  In such
a  context,  what  does  tolerance  mean?  How  can  it  be  that  a
traditionalist  may  say,  "We tolerated  them,  after  all we  appointed
them,  but  they  don't  tolerate  us,"  when  a  newcomer  says,
simultaneously,  "Where's their  tolerance, really?  I happen to think
traditional  doctrinal work is bunk"?  Who  is  putting up and who  is
putting down?  There  are more  important struggles out  there than
what  goes  on  in  law  schools.  Yet,  if we  can't  make  sense  of
91 Ibid. at xiii.
92 Ibid. at xi.
93 My experience representing  diverse religious organizations  in an  abortion rights case
before  the Supreme  Court (see Reproductive Services, supra, note 64)  similarly suggests that
the common  threat - state regulation  - can bring otherwise disparate and  mistrustful  groups
together.
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tolerance, and pay  attention  to who  is oppressed by what we do in
its name or despite it, how can we expect  anyone else  to?